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STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR REHEARING
The Appellant now petitions this Court for a rehearing in this
case pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
In affirming the Summary Judgment decisions of the trial court
dated June 15, 1989, July 20, 1989, and August 10, 1989, the Court
of Appeals misapprehended the application of the law as it applies
to the present case, and misapplied Rule 31 of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals as it applies to this case in its Order dated
June 5, 1990.

Moreover, the Appellant believes that in reaching

this conclusion, the Appellate Court erred in its application of
the established legal precedents to the facts presented in the
record on appeal, and the amended correct record on appeal.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING
I.

Does a tenant have a counterclaim right against the
landlord for locking the rent paid storage unit doors
for a period of time in excess of five (5) months?
And were the counterclaim rights denied in violation
of the law?

II.

Does a conflicting, unsigned, and unfiled, Deposition
supplanted by the Attorney's canned Affidavit, for the
same witness, for the same day, at the same time, and
notarized by himself, constitute an act of fraud, when
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relied upon and utilized to obtain a Summary Judgment?
III.

Is a Tenant/ or any of his family members, entitled
to any Exempt Property?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THE APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING AS FOLLOWS:
United States Constitution 14th Amendment
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-2
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-3(1)
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-3(2)
Utah Judicial Code Section 38-8-3(3)
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-23-0
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-36-2(1)
Utah Judicial Code Section 78-36-8.5
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 3.4.(b)
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 8.4.(c)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13
SDMMARV OF THE ARGUMENTS
A tenant does have a counterclaim right against the landlord
for locking the rent paid storage unit doors, and the counterclaim
rights denied were in violation of the law; a conflicting unsigned,
unfiled, Deposition supplanted by the Attorney's canned Affidavit,
for the same witness, for the same day, at the same time, and
notarized by himself, constitutes an act of fraud, when relied upon
and utilized to obtain a Summary Judgment.

The tenant and his

family are entitled to all exempt property.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
A TENANT DOES HAVE A COUNTERCLAIM RIGHT AGAINST THE LANDLORD
FOR LOCKING THE RENT PAID STORAGE UNIT DOORS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME
IN EXCESS OF FIVE (5) MONTHS AND THE COUNTERCLAIM RIGHTS DENIED
WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
There is no question that the Respondent-landlord locked the
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Appellant-tenant rent-paid storage unit doors, for in excess of
five (5) months, (R at 56 par. 14 and 23).
The Respondent's claim for locking the rent-paid storage unit
doors sounds of fraud, discussed in ISSUE II of this Petition For
Rehearing.

However, the Respondents claims do not comport with

law and will not be discussed in this issue.
The foundation of renting any facility from a landlord is the
implied covenant that the tenant can come and go as he pleases,
having undisturbed access so long as the tenant does not damage the
property, create garbage, interfere with other tenants, and the
rent it paid on time.
In this case, the rent was paid on time (App-4 and 7), but to
no avail, because the landlord did not abide by his own implied
covenant to undisturbed access discussed in the Appellant's Brief
pages 29 through 34.

Moreover, this is a violation of the Utah

Judicial Code 78-36-2(1),(APP-31A) which states:
"Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer
who . . . (1) by force, or by menaces and
threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps
the possession of any real property, whether the
same was acquired peaceable or otherwise . . . M
The Respondent, is not immune or exempted in anyway from the
unlawful locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors,
discussed

in

the

Appellant's

Consequently,

the

Appellant

Reply
is

Brief

entitled

pages
to

an

11

and

12.

appropriate

counterclaim pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
No. 13 (R at 69).
The Trial Court Minute Entries dated June 15, 1989, (APP-45)
and July 20, 1989, (APP-46) denied the counterclaim right.
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The

Court of Appeals denied the counterclaim rights in each of three
occasions:
A.

Order denying Extraordinary Writ—Case No.
890455-CA, dated July 25, 1989, (R.B. page 26)-despite a similar ruling in White v. District
Court of Utah County 232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951).

B.

Order denying Motions, Case No. 890461-CA, dated
August 1, 1989, (R.B. page 27).

C.

Order Summary Judgment affirmance, Case No.
890461-CA, dated June 5, 1990.

This is a violation of each of the following:
A.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13.

B.

U.S.
Constitution
14th
protection of the laws.

In

summary,

the

Amendment,

U.S. Constitution

14th

equal
Amendment

(equal

protection of the laws), the statute (forcible detainer) the rules
(U.R.C.P. No. 13 counterclaim) and the case law (White v. District
Court

of

Utah

County)

all

gives

rise

to

the

Appellant's

counterclaim rights. Why have the Appellant's counterclaim rights
been dilatorily and repeatedly denied?
In

short,

the Appellant

is entitled

to

the

counterclaim

rights, which include a trial asserting damages for trover and
conversion, for both his business property earnings; the amending
of

the

Appellant's

Counterclaim

Complaint

for

the

property

maliciously sold by the Respondent—in violation of the Appellant's
PROPERTY BOND (APP-40, 40A), tendered and signed by the Respondent
(App-1) July 21, 1989, prior to the fraudulent, unlawful disposal
of his, his spouses, and his children's property July 25, 1989.
This court must grant the Appellant's counterclaim rights as a
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matter of law under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13
and the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment equal protection of the
laws, and due process of the law, (APP-32A).
ISSUE II
A CONFLICTING UNSIGNED, UNFILED, DEPOSITION SUPPLANTED BY THE
ATTORNEY'S CANNED AFFIDAVIT, FOR THE SAME WITNESS, FOR THE SAME
DAY, AT THE SAME TIME, AND NOTARIZED BY HIMSELF, CONSTITUTES AN ACT
OF FRAUD, WHEN RELIED UPON AND UTILIZED TO OBTAIN A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The facts of this issue can be reviewed from the record the
Respondent

(R at 56 par. 13.), the Appellant

(R at

55), the

Respondent (R at 53 on page 2 ) , note specifically:
"Since the affidavit was
by Plaintiff's counsel,
minor changes necessary
deposition may have been

prepared before the deposition
it is only natural that some
to make it comport with the
omitted."

Moreover, the Appellant contests (R at 54 paragraph 3 ) :
" . . . demands that the Plaintiff explain the
purpose of the Deposition if the canned
Affidavit was waiting for Ms. Audrey Hooper's
signature in purporting, 'I explained to him on
several occasions that it was a mistake, that
there was no reduction in rent and never had
been, and that he owed the full $40 per unit per
month.
On each of these occasions, the
explanation was made in writing, a copy of one
of which is attached hereto.'"
Now, please review the Appellant's objections (R at 50 par. Nos.
4, 5, 14, 15, and 16) and the Respondent's assertions filed with
the trial court after the minute entry dated June 15, 1989, (R at
46 page 2, par. 4 ) .

The trial court ignored knowledge (R at 44

par. 7 ) , (R at 45 par. 4) and the Trial Court's reliance upon the
Respondent's assertion (R at 41 par. 4) and the Court of Appeals'
ignorance of the Appellant's Reply Brief Issue Nos. I and II which
deserves more than the curt judicial whisk conveyed in its Court
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Order dated June 5, 1990.
There is no question that the Respondent's legal council knew
that

his previously

completing

the

prepared

scheduled

canned Affidavit
Deposition

on

was false, when

April

29,

1989.

Nevertheless, he escorted his patsy, duped-witness into another
room with the door ajar whereby he instructed his patsy, dupedwitness to sign the canned Affidavit
after

attesting

to

controverting

(APP-5, 5A), just moments
facts,

the

described

through 7.

The Attorney's intention and his hope was that of
a

Summary

Judgment

for

his

Reply

scheduled

Deposition,

obtaining

in the Appellant's

in

Brief

client

by

pages 1

asserting

reformation of the contract, the Respondent's claim of a mistake
to

a

previous

rent-rate

in

violation

of

the

contractual

notification requirements, by asserting DEFAULT in attempting to
justify

the locking of the Appellant's

rent-paid

storage unit

doors.

And finally, in providing evidence that the court would

believe that there existed a DEFAULT so that he—the

Attorney—

could get paid by the Appellant for his services rendered, instead
of by his client.

Perhaps his client believed that it would be

cheaper to claim default, mistake and require the Appellant to pay
contract

reformation and moving expenses, rather

than

for the

Respondent to pay moving expenses when retaliatorily expelling the
Appellant from the properly rented facilities by force, fraud, and
now wrongful eviction.

This, in my opinion, is a violation of the

Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule Nos. 3.4.(b) (App-35) and
8.4.(c) (App-37).

Many an attorney has been disbarred for similar

actions, and Mr. Lynn P. Heward should be no exception.
-6-

Some

relevant cases in point which should apply to the case at bar are
as follows:
M

The use of evidence by an attorney on behalf
of his client, in a court proceeding, of an
account known by him to be fabricated, is a
violation of the attorney's oath of office and
is grounds for disbarment.11
RE Ernest H. O'Brien, 14 ALR 859 (1921).
M

Accordinglyf disciplinary action will lie
against an attorney for inducing a witness to
testify falsely,"
7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law

/ 4 3 Pages 97, 98, and 99.

Hence, the Affidavits of both Ms. Audrey Hooper, (APP-5, 5A)
and Mr. Steven J. Nelson (APP-14, 14A) add nothing to this case
because each reeks of conspiracy and fraud—all manipulated and
controlled by, in my opinion, their crafty Attorney, Mr. Lynn P.
Heward, in attempting to prove rent-rates in violation of the
contractual

notification

requirements, in attempting

to prove

statutory duties of responsibility, in violation of the statutory
prerequisites to enforcement, which were utilized in violation of
the contractual termination and default provisions of the
Agreement.
asserted

Rental

Consequently, by fraudulent means the Respondent has

and

obtained

enforcement

of

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration, Section 38-8-3 (R.B. page 8) without the proper
compliance with Utah Code of Judicial Administration Sections 388-2, 38-8-3(2), and 38-8-3(3),

(R.B. page 8, 9 ) . Therefore, this

tenant, his spouse, and his children have been stripped of all
their personal possessions accumulated in various parts of the
world through inheritance, hard work, and careful planning.
is

the

equal

protection

of

the
-7-

laws

set

forth

in

Where

the U.S.

Constitution 14th Amendment?

(App-32A)
ISSOE III

THE TENANT AND EACH MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY ARE ENTITLED TO ALL
EXEMPT PROPERTY.
A careful review of the uncontroverted facts Appellant's Brief
pages 34 through 46 renders the appropriate exempt property claims
that should be honored and enforced by this Court,
The Respondent has argued pages 23 through 27 of his Brief
that the Appellant waited nearly four months after the sale to
claim exempt property, therefore no claim should be allowed.
The Appellant must argue that the Respondent's asserted claim
of n default for the rent-paid storage units for the first period
of time May 1988 through September 1988, and for the second period
of time October 1988 through December 1988, should be denied since
the Respondent waited until January

20, 1989, more than eight

months later for the first period of time, and nearly four months
later for the second period of time to make his asserted claim of
default.

Therefore, no asserted

claim

of

default

should

be

allowed.
The Appellant finds the Respondent's illogic and subterfuge
of

an

excuse

in

violation

of

the

Appellant's

tendered

and

Respondent signed PROPERTY BOND, Utah Judicial Code 78-36-8.5 (App40, 40A) and (App-1), the U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment Section
1 (App-32A)— M Nor shall any state (Utah) deprive any person . . .
[of] property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
If these are more than just words with full force and effect,
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then the force must come from this court.

Please do that now!

CONCLOSION
There is no question that the Appellant is entitled to an
appropriate

counterclaim.

There

is

no

question

that

the

supplanting by the Attorney of the canned Affidavit for the same
witness, for the same day, at the same time, and notarized by
himself, constitutes an act of fraud when relied upon and utilized
to obtain a Summary Judgment, and finally, there is no question
that the tenant and all of his family members are entitled to all
exempt property, undamaged or full payment restitution immediately.
Therefore, this case should be reversed and remanded for trial
since the established legal precedents to the facts presented in
the record on appeal, and the amended correct record on appeal
requires that this Court remand the matter back to the trial court
for an analysis of the issues of material facts set forth and
uncontroverted in this Appeal.
The Appellant, William L. Echols, hereby certifies that this
Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Dated this

IS

day of

\j^lH<L^

, 1990.

Respectfully Submitted

William L. Echols, Pro-Se
Defendant and Appellant
733 North 800 West
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 377-0705
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Petition For Rehearing was hand delivered to Lynn P,
Heward #1479, Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East
5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, on this
day of \J UH^

, 1990.

agreed.

/J>*—

The sum of three copies, as

io^k~ &? ^ 4
William L. Echols, Pro-Se
Defendant and Appellant
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38-8-2

LIENS

occupants who are to have access to the facility for the purpose of storing
and removing personal property. No occupant may use a self-service storage facility for residential purposes. The owner of a self-service storage
facility is not a warehouseman as used in Subsection 70A-7-102(l)(h). If
an owner issues any warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document
of title for the personal property stored, the owner and the occupant are
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the provisions of this chapter do not apply.
History: C. 1953, 38-8-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 171, § 1.

38-8-2. Lien against stored property — Attachment and
duration — Search for financing statement prerequisite to enforcement of lien.
Where a rental agreement, as defined in Subsection 38-8-1(6), is entered
into between the owner and the occupant, the owner of the self-service storage
facility and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns have
a lien upon all personal property located at the self-service storage facility for
rent, labor, or other charges, present or future, in relation to the personal
property and for expenses necessary for its preservation or expenses reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition under this chapter. The lien
attaches as of the date the personal property is brought to the self-service
storage facility and continues so long as the owner retains possession and
until any default is corrected, or a sale pursuant to a default is conducted, or
the property is otherwise disposed of to satisfy the lien. Before taking enforcement action under Section 38-8-3, the owner shall determine if a financing
statement filed in accordance with Section 70A-9-401, et seq. has been filed
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code concerning the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of.
History: C. 1953, 38-8-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 171, § 2; L. 1984, ch. 66, § 163.
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amendment substituted "with the Division of Corpo-

rations and Commercial Code" for "in the office
of the lieutenant governor" in the last sentence; and made minor changes in style,

38-8-3. Enforcement of lien — Notice requirements — Sale
procedure and effect.
A claim of an owner which has become due against an occupant and which
is secured by the owner's lien may be satisfied as follows:
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the owner until the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of 30 days.
(2) After the occupant has been in default continuously for a period of
30 days, the owner may begin enforcement action if the occupant has been
given notice in writing. The notice shall be delivered in person or sent by
certified mail to the last known address of the occupant, and a copy of the
notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the sheriff of the county where
the self-service storage facility is located. Any lienholder with an interest
in the property to be sold or otherwise disposed of, of whom the owner has
562
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d
57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d
924 (1968); Lewis v. Porter, 548 P.2d 496 (Utah
T 3 ^ L a n g e r V n? a V 1 > 6 1 9 i P c 2 o d n 6 | 7 oi U i t a ^
Clty C
UnCl1
}fS°i
(Utah S£S
1981); rCarnes v.°p
Carnes,*SL
668 PP.2d III
555

(Utah 1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694
P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr.
Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747
p 2 d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rothey v.
Walker Bank & x ^
C o ^ 7 5 4 P 2 d 1222
(Utah 1988); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First
Natl Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 38,
43 to 45; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237,
280, 389 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136,
138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to
268, 424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to
586.
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of
civil action as affected by opponent's motion for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Necessity of hearing and oral argument in

federal courts on motion for summary judgment or for judgment on the pleadings, 1
A.L.R. Fed. 295.
What, other than affidavits, constitutes
"matters outside the pleadings," which may
convert motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), (c) into motion for summary
judgment, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 1027.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or
13(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) as
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Key Numbers. — Dismissal and Nonsuit «=»
67; Pleading «=» 76 et seq., 85, 89 to 95, 218 to
226, 342 to 350, 361 to 364, 367, 404 to 413.

Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule
13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the
pleading of the opposing party. .
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
40
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(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
action and certify the same and transmit all papers therein to the district
court of the county in which such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of
the fees required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and for
docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein required to be paid,
shall be deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the time of filing such
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike such counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim.
IIL any action so certified to the district court, when any responsive pleading
is required or permitted or a motion is allowed under these rules, the time in
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be made shall commence to
run from the time notice of the filing of the cause in the district court shall be
served on the party making such responsive pleading or motion.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 13, F.R.C.P.
The Rules Committee, in the preparation of
these rules, embodied the following as a note to
this rule: "Inasmuch as a question may arise as
to whether a counterclaim or other similar

pleading is within the jurisdiction of the city or
justice's court, it was deemed necessary by the
committee to leave it to the court's discretion
whether such pleading should be stricken or
the party filing the same allowed to deposit the
necessary cost after hearing upon notice."
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